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RACIST
Robert Steinbuch*
Racist has become a largely meaningless term of political invec-
tive-like . . . Liberal, Neocon[servative], name your favorite term
of political invective. In the opinionation business, being called a
racist isn't so much an insult as an occupational hazard. As often
as it's thrown around, the term Racist has come to mean anybody
you really, really dislike. Or just really, really disagree with.,
So said the newspaper of record in Little Rock, Arkansas-the Demo-
crat-Gazette--the city in which I live and teach law. Disturbingly, I have
heard the same sentiment from others-some of whom are quite learned.2
I am troubled by this idea, not only because I think that it is wrong but
because I think that it is wrongheaded. I have never been called a racist.3
* Visiting Associate Professor of Law, University of Georgia School of Law. Associate
Professor of Law, University of Arkansas at Little Rock, William H. Bowen School
of Law. J.D. from, and John M. Olin Law & Economics Fellow at, Columbia Law
School. B.A. and M.A. from the University of Pennsylvania. Former attorney with
the United States Department of Justice, and the United States Senate Committee on
the Judiciary. The author wishes to thank Professor Pearl Steinbuch, Rabbi Pinchus
Ciment, Professor J. Thomas Sullivan, and Professor Frances Fendler for their gui-
dance and contributions.
1. Editorial, End this Farce: The Law School Follies of '08, ARK. DEMOCRAT-GAZETtE, Mar.
19, 2008, at 18.
2. A friend suggested to me that those who equate the charge of "racist" with the
label of, say, "conservative" may be doing so to reclaim the word in the fashion that
the Gay-rights movement has attempted to reclaim the term "queer." See, e.g., FEAR
OF A QUEER PLANET Xi (Michael Warner ed., 1993). I believe that this analogy is
misplaced. The term "queer" had been used as an insulting and degrading version
of "gay," but it does not embody a different or additional meaning. In contrast,
"racist" is not simply a degrading version of "liberal" or "conservative." "Racist,"
as discussed, refers to the evil of judging people based on their genetic associations
rather than personal qualities. "Liberal" and "conservative" merely refer to a po-
litical philosophy. In order to equate "racist" with "liberal" or "conservative," we
would not only have to strip the pejorative from "racist"--as is being attempted
with "queer"-but we would have to remove its essential meaning as well.
3. In an Op-Ed in The New York Times, Nicholas D. Kristof discusses a University of
Chicago on-line psychological test that serves as a proxy for racist biases. In the test,
available at http://backhand.uchicago.edu/Center/ShooterEffect/, participants en-
counter a series of 100 black and white men, each holding either a gun or another
object. Each participant is charged with shooting the gunmen and holstering the
firearm for the unarmed. If the participant shoots blacks more quickly than whites,
describes Mr. Kristof, this shows racial bias--as does the more rapid holstering of
the gun when confronted with unarmed whites over unarmed blacks. Mr. Kristof
recounted that
[t]o my horror, I turn out to be a racist.... I shot armed blacks in an average of
0.679 seconds, while I waited slightly longer-0.694 seconds--to shoot armed
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Had I been, however, I would have been deeply offended and hurt, be-
cause the label of "racist" constitutes a demonstrably negative epithet.
The label of "racist" disparages its recipient precisely because it prop-
erly conveys the evil of hatred towards mankind. As a practicing Jew, I
can personally attest to this evil-having experienced discrimination
throughout my academic and professional life in forms varying from in-
sensitivity and intolerance, to outright verbal and physical hostility.4 I
would do my family an injustice, however, if I did not make clear that my
experiences pale in comparison to the discrimination that many of my
whites. Conversely, I holstered my gun more quickly when encountering un-
armed whites than unarmed blacks. Take the test yourself and you'll probably
find that you show bias as well.
Nicholas D. Kristof, Our Racist, Sexist Selves, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 6, 2008, at 14, available
at http: / /www.nytimes.com/2008/04/06/opinion/O6kristof.html?ex=1208318400
&en=9976f14f38576d88&ei=5070&emc=etal. I took this test. I shot armed whites
more quickly than armed blacks, and I holstered my weapon more quickly with
unarmed blacks than with unarmed whites-showing no racial bias against blacks
based on the claims about the validity of the test. As much as I agree with the
conclusion suggested by those who would endorse the validity of the test, I have
my doubts as to whether the test is scientifically reliable.
4. Some question whether Judaism is a race in addition to a religion. The Second Cir-
cuit stated:
Jews... are today generally not considered a distinct race.... [However], the
Supreme Court's case law firmly and clearly rules that Jews count as a "race"
under certain civil rights statutes enacted pursuant to Congress's power under
the Thirteenth Amendment .... [T]hese cases not only extend the protections
of Reconstruction Era civil rights statutes, now codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981
and 1982, to Jews understood as a "race," they also implicitly rule that the
Thirteenth Amendment... protects Jews as a race.
United States v. Nelson, 277 F.3d 164, 176-77 (2d Cir. 2002) (citing St. Francis Coll. v.
Al-Khazraji, 481 U.S. 604, 611 (1987)); see Shaare Tefila Congregation v. Cobb, 481
U.S. 615, 617-18 (1987). Others question the usefulness of the inquiry itself.
[For the purposes] of describing human diversity[, tioday, geneticists use the
term "ancestry" or "populations" when describing how groups of people have
evolved .... The overwhelming majority of Jewish populations throughout the
world... share a common Middle Eastern ancestry on the male line that goes
back to ancient Israel 4000 years ago, when, according to the Bible, Abraham
founded the Israelite line. In other words, as the lead researcher Michael Ham-
mer commented, "[Jews] are really a single ethnic group coming from the Mid-
dle East."
Interview by Aron Hirt-Manheimer & Joy Weinberg with Jon Entine, Cracking the
Code, REFORM JUDAISM, Spring 2008, at 28, 30-31. Nonetheless, Jews have undoubt-
edly suffered throughout history due to their status as Jews. For example, then
Congressman--and later United States Senator-Morris Sheppard (Democrat from
Texas) wrote in 1906:
[I]t seems unthinkable that death and torture and exclusion should have been
the[ ] [Jewish people's] fortune through so many ages and that today they suf-
fer the most ferocious and inexorable discriminations in eastern Europe. This
last condition is the foulest stain on our civilization, the darkest indictment of
our time. If Protestants were wronged in eastern Europe as are the Jews-and
I, a Protestant, make the assertion-protests would be thundered from the lead-
ing powers and the peoples of the earth, protests which unheeded would be re-
enforced with battleships.
MORRIS SHEPPARD, AN ADDRESS TO THE YOUNG MEN'S AND WOMEN'S CULTURE SOCI-
ETY OF TEMPLE RODEPH SHOLOM, CONTRIBUTIONS OF THE HEBREW PEOPLE TO HUMAN
ADVANCEMENT (1906), reprinted in ORATORY OF THE SOUTH 171, 174 (Edwin DeBois
Shurter, ed., 1908).
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relatives suffered. My father, for example, lived under both Nazi occupa-
tion and Stalinist rule during World War II. His ordeal could fill a book,
but the highlights-if I can use this word to describe such difficulties-
include traveling for two months in a freight train to spend a year in a
barbed-wire encircled prison camp in Siberia. He and his fellow prison-
ers lived in unheated huts without plumbing or electricity, under the con-
stant watchful eye of the Soviet military. My father was a child, but the
adults were taken daily by armed guard to perform manual labor. Dur-
ing the Siberian winter, the old and weak died, while the young and
strong fought over the limited food available. My father's experiences,
though dreadful, were nonetheless preferable to those of my numerous
relatives who were directly tortured and murdered by the Nazis.5 Thus, I
feel that I am particularly aware of the horrors of racial discrimination.
I am equally sensitive to the accusation of racism, as well as the partic-
ular dangers of the wrongful accusation of such, i.e., race-baiting. Race-
baiting constitutes the specific genre of name-calling that "impl[ies] that
there is an underlying race based motive in the actions of others towards
the group baited, where none in fact exists."6 Race-baiting etymologically
and historically relates to red-baiting, the act of "accusing someone ... of
being communist.... The term [has been] used mainly with the intention
of discrediting the individual's or organization's political views." 7 In-
deed, red-baiting has a particularly pernicious and shameful past. Dur-
ing two historic periods in the United States, the 1920s and the 1950s, the
mere assertion of an association with communism bore dramatically neg-
ative consequences, including suicides, destroyed careers, and devastated
families.8 Several industries, including the film industry, "banned those
named and a whole lot of others for decades."9 Race-baiting equally dev-
astates its subjects.
While never having been labeled a racist, I have been called both a
liberal and a conservative (usually not at the same time). Neither of-
fended me--regardless of the accuracy. Putting election-year rhetoric
5. Interestingly, the Nazis clearly viewed Jews as a race not a religion and exercised
their prejudice based on their racial perception of Jews. United States Holocaust
Memorial Museum, Nazi Racism, http://www.ushmm.org/outreach/racism.htm
("Hitler and other Nazi leaders viewed the Jews not as a religious group, but as a
poisonous 'race,' which 'lived off' the other races and weakened them"). The Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission states that "[e]qual employment opportu-
nity cannot be denied any person because of his/her racial group or perceived racial
group." EEOC, Race/Color Discrimination, http://www.eeoc.gov/types/race.html
(last visited Apr. 10, 2008) (emphasis added).
6. Reference.com, Race-baiting, http://www.reference.com/search?r=13&q=Race%
20baiting (last visited Apr. 4, 2008) (emphasis added).
7. Reference.com, Red-baiting, http://www.reference.com/browse/wiki/Red-baiting
(last visited Apr. 4, 2008).
8. Id.; David Cole, Are you Now or Have You ever been a Member of the ACLU?, 90 MICH.
L. REV. 1404, 1404 (1992) ("In 1930, Hamilton Fish created the House Special Com-
mittee to Investigate Communist Activities, initiating a spate of witch[-]hunting and
blacklisting that was continued into the late 1950s by [the infamous] Senator Joseph
McCarthy and the House Special Committee on Un-American Activities.").
9. Christopher Reed & Mike Ellison, "Red-baiting" Denouement in Hollywood, THE
GUARDIAN (London), Mar. 20, 1999, at 9, available at http://film.guardian.co.uk/
TheOscars_1999/Story/0,,36566,00.html#article continue.
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aside, neither liberals nor conservatives are evil. They are, at worst, mis-
guided at times. As such, the labels "liberal" and "conservative" simply
are not pejorative. Liberal- or conservative-baiting does not exist.
Indeed, when I studied for my two degrees in political science from
the University of Pennsylvania, I routinely engaged in discussions and
debates about, well, political science. My classmates and I regularly de-
scribed individuals or their views by their political orientation. In fact,
we often tried to convince each other of the merits of liberal or conserva-
tive views. Other times we tried to persuade each other that both were
virtuous, while even other times we argued that neither provided the an-
swer. We never, however, suggested that these political views were evil,
and we never considered the labels "liberal" and "conservative"
invective.
That is not to say that some have not tried to use political designations
to attack others. For example, when then Vice President George H. W.
Bush ran for President, he and fellow Republicans made a calculated de-
cision to label his opponent, former Massachusetts Governor Michael
Dukakis, a "liberal."10 But when Vice President Bush did so, Governor
Dukakis "accepted the label ... declaring, 'I'm a liberal in the tradition of
Franklin Roosevelt and Harry Truman and John Kennedy."'
True, left-of-center politicians have not always willingly worn the la-
bel "liberal." But when Democrats have avoided the term, they have not
done so because the "liberal" label is a pejorative. Rather, they have dis-
favored the description based on the understanding that at least since
World War II most voters do not self identify as "liberal;" most left-of-
center voters choose the term "progressive."12 We saw exactly this dis-
tinction being employed in the recent presidential campaign: former
presidential candidate and then United States Senator Hillary Clinton, in
response to the question whether "she would describe herself as a 'lib-
eral,"' 13 said "I prefer the word 'progressive."' 14 Based on the same un-
10. Robin Toner, Dukakis Asserts He Is a "Liberal," But in Old Tradition of His Party, NY
TIMES, Oct. 31, 1988, available at http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=
940DE5DDIF30F932A05753CA96E948260. In saying that "Liberal" is not a "dirty
word," Alan Colmes, the Liberal commentator declared "I'm proud to be a lib-
eral.... There is nothing wrong with being a liberal." Alan Colmes on Hannity and
Colmes, (Fox News broadcast Apr. 17, 2008) (available at http://www.foxnews.com
/ video2/videoO8.html?playerld = videolandingpage&streamingFormat =FLASH&
referralObjec=Celaf0O34-0645-49d5-bd78-e75d3fb2aaed&referralPlaylistld=949437
d0db05ed5f5b9954dc049d70b0c12f249) (select "Newt Gingrich" video; quote start-
ing at 1:35 remaining). See generally, PROUD TO BE LIBERAL (Robert Lasner & Eliza-
beth Clementson eds., 2006); Alan Colmes's Liberaland, http://liberaland.com/.
11. Id.
12. Susan Page & Jill Lawrence, Does "Massachusetts Liberal" Label Still Matter?, USA
TODAY, July 26, 2004, available at http://www.usatoday.com/news/politicselect
ions/nation/president/2004-07-25-mass-liberal-x.htm ("[T]he label of liberal has
fallen on hard times. Many now prefer 'progressive.' In a USA TODAY poll [taken
in 2004], [only] 20% of voters called themselves 'liberal."').
13. David Paul Kuhn, Dems Wary of "Liberal" Label; GOP Embraces "Conservative", USA
TODAY Nov. 12, 2007, available at http://www.usatoday.com/news/politics/2007-
11-12-liberal-conservativeN.htm.
14. Id. However, Hillary Clinton advisor and former White House Counsel Lanny Da-
vis said "I am an unapologetic liberal Democrat. I don't even use the word progres-
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derlying logic, conservatives have not shied away from the eponymous
label,15 as one poll in "October 2005 .. .note[d that] sixty-one percent of
Americans considered themselves 'conservative' or 'very conserva-
tive."' 16 As such, Republicans typically not only accepted the label "con-
servative," they have embraced it.17 Thus, while "liberal" is not
derogatory, it may exemplify sub-optimal marketing.
In this paper, I investigate the difference between the labels "racist,"
on the one hand, and "liberal" and "conservative," on the other, in four
contexts: employment, admission to the bar, the use of peremptory chal-
lenges in jury selection, and defamation law. I conclude that the other-
wise able Democrat-Gazette got it wrong: the epithet "racist" is
significant and harmful, unlike the generally benign classifications "lib-
eral" and "conservative."
The lesson: the label "racist" is a pernicious pejorative and is gener-
ally recognized by the law as such. It should not be bandied about frivo-
lously, but, rather, should be reserved for those situations in which actual
racial discrimination exists.
I. DEFINITIONS
One dictionary defines "racist" as:
n.
"a person with a prejudiced belief that one race is superior to
others[;]
racialist[;J
bigot - a prejudiced person who is intolerant of any opinions dif-
fering from his own."18
adj.
1. racist - based on racial intolerance; "racist remarks"[;]
racial - of or characteristic of race or races or arising from differ-
ences among groups; "racial differences"; "racial discrimina-
tion"[;]
2. racist - discriminatory especially on the basis of race or
religion[;]
sive." Interview by Bill O'Reilly with Lanny Davis, O'Reilly Factor, (Fox News
television broadcast May 1, 2008).
15. See id.
16. Bruce Walker, The Greatest News Yet in the Battleground Poll, INTELLECTUAL CONSERVA-
TIVE: CONSERVATIVE AND LIBERTARIAN POLITICS, Oct. 10, 2006, http://www.intellect
ualconservative.com/2006/10/10/the-greatest-news-yet-in-the-battleground-poll/.
17. See, e.g., Press Release, John McCain 2008, Former Oklahoma Governor Supports
McCain: McCain's Conservative Principles Attract Keating's Support (Feb. 20, 2007),
available at http://www.vote-john-mccain-2008.com/Informing/News/PressReleas
es/a509cadO-30bc-4673-af8d-fab9295caOb9.htm (last visited April 18, 2008) ("'John
McCain has been an honored servant of our country and his experience making
common sense conservative policy sets him apart,' said [Former Oklahoma Governor
Frank] Keating. 'Our country learned powerful lessons from President Reagan, and
Senator McCain's conservative convictions and effective approach are a living testa-
ment to his philosophies."') (emphasis added).
18. Thefreedictionary.com, Racist, http://www.thefreedictionary.com/racist (last vis-
ited Apr. 3, 2008).
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anti-semite, antiblack[;]
discriminatory, prejudiced - being biased or having a belief or atti-
tude formed beforehand; "a prejudiced judge."19
Other dictionaries similarly equate "racist" with "racism."20 Adjacent
to these definitions are pictures of, inter alia, a hooded individual that
appears to be a Ku Klux Klan member and a Nazi swastika.21




a. Not limited to or by established, traditional, orthodox, or au-
thoritarian attitudes, views, or dogmas; free from bigotry.
b. Favoring proposals for reform, open to new ideas for progress,
and tolerant of the ideas and behavior of others; broad-
minded.... characteristic of a political party founded on or asso-
ciated with principles of social and political liberalism, especially
in Great Britain, Canada, and the United States....
n.
1. A person with liberal ideas or opinions.
2. Liberal A member of a Liberal political party.22
conservative -
adj.
1. Favoring traditional views and values; tending to oppose
change....
a. Of or relating to the political philosophy of conservatism.
b. Belonging to a conservative party, group, or movement....
n.
1. One favoring traditional views and values.
2. A supporter of political conservatism .... 23
19. Id.; see Princeton's Wordnet, Racist, http://wordnet.princeton.edu/perl/webwn?
s=racist&sub = Search+ WordNet&o2= &oO = 1&o7 = &o5 = &ol = 1&o6 = &o4= &o3 =
&h= (last visited Apr. 3, 2008) ("racist, racialist (a person with a prejudiced belief
that one race is superior to others) .... (based on racial intolerance) 'racist re-
marks'. . . . antiblack, anti-Semite (discriminatory especially on the basis of race or
religion)").
20. Merriam-Webster Online, Racism, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/
racism (last visited Apr. 3, 2008) (defining racism as "1: a belief that race is the
primary determinant of human traits and capacities and that racial differences pro-
duce an inherent superiority of a particular race[;] 2: racial prejudice or discrimina-
tion."); Dictionary.com, Racist, http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/racist
(defining racism "a belief or doctrine that inherent differences among the various
human races determine cultural or individual achievement, usually involving the
idea that one's own race is superior and has the right to rule others") (last visited
Apr. 3, 2008).
21. Thefreedictionary.com, Racist, http://www.thefreedictionary.com/racist (last vis-
ited Apr. 3, 2008).
22. Thefreedictionary.com, Liberal, http://www.thefreedictionary.com/liberal (last
visited April 3, 2008) (emphasis added).
23. Thefreedictionary.com, Conservative, http://www.thefreedictionary.com/conserva
tive (last visited Apr. 3, 2008).
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No pictures or symbols were provided with these definitions for "lib-
eral" and "conservative" as was done by the same dictionary for
"racist. "24
These definitions start to highlight the distinction between calling
someone "racist," versus "liberal" or "conservative." As one former
Democratic Vice Presidential candidate said, calling someone "racist...
is inflammatory."25 The legal ramifications of calling someone "racist"
make clear that the charge is serious and pejorative.
II. EMPLOYMENT
The accusation and substantiation of the appellation "racist" often
spawn significant consequences in the employment context. The designa-
tion as a "liberal" or "conservative," in contrast, typically lacks negative
effects in employment. Indeed, pursuant to the United States Constitu-
tion, those designations usually may not be the basis for adverse employ-
ment actions.
For example, when one employee sued his employer for "subject[ing
him] to interviews regarding his alleged 'racist remarks,"' 26 the court not
only said that the employer could investigate an allegation that an em-
ployee is a racist, the court held that the employer must investigate: "An
employer has a duty to investigate a charge that one of its employees has
engaged in discriminatory conduct."27 If the charge is confirmed upon
investigation, racist remarks alone properly serve as a basis for punish-
ment in the workplace.28 Indeed, adverse employment actions for racist
comments are not only permitted, they are virtually demanded. If an em-
ployer does not rectify racist statements of its employees, that employer
itself may become subject to a Title VII claim for a hostile work
environment.29
Moreover, while the accurate charge of racism results in sanction to
the racist in the employment context, the false charge that someone is a
racist is so serious that if an employee makes such an accusation, an em-
ployer is justified in taking adverse action against that employee.30 In
24. Id.; accord Thefreedictionary.com, Liberal, http://www.thefreedictionary.com/lib-
eral (last visited Apr. 3, 2008); Thefreedictionary.com, Neoconservative, http://
www.thefreedictionary.com/neoconservative (last visited Apr. 3, 2008).
25. Interview by Sean Hannity & Alan Colmes with Geraldine Ferraro, Hannity and
Colmes (Fox News television broadcast Apr. 3, 2008).
26. Burke v. Sears-Roebuck, 1999 WL 358915, at *2 (E.D. Pa. June 2, 1999) (citing Scott v.
Western State Hospital, 658 F. Supp. 593, 598 (W.D. Va. 1987)).
27. Id.
28. E.g., Jones v. Cargill, Inc., 490 F. Supp. 2d 978, 984-86 (N.D. Iowa 2007).
29. E.g., Cortes-Devito v. Vill. of Stone Park, 390 F. Supp. 2d 706, 712 (N.D. Il. 2005)
(citing Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1)).
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, for example, makes it unlawful for an
employer to discriminate against an employee "because of such individual's
race, color, religion, sex, or national origin." ...In Hishon, we rejected the argu-
ment that Title VII infringed employers' First Amendment rights. And more
recently ... we cited Title VII (as well as 18 U.S.C. § 242 and 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981
and 1982) as an example of a permissible content-neutral regulation of conduct.
Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 508 U.S. 476, 487 (1993) (citations omitted).
30. Taylor v. Carmouche, 214 F.3d 788, 793-94 (7th Cir. 2000).
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Taylor v. Carmouche,31 for example, an employee was disciplined for falsely
accusing a supervisor of being a racist. The Seventh Circuit listed the
possible ramifications of wrongly asserting that someone is a racist: The
"penalty [for the false approbation of "racist"] is delivered in a slander
action, in a perjury prosecution, in an award of attorneys' fees for making
unsubstantiated allegations, or in the workplace by a suspension."32
Accusing someone of being a racist may prompt an investigation. If
the accusation proves true, it will often result in a disciplinary action,
while a false accusation may result in suspension. The label or identifica-
tion as a "liberal" or a "conservative," however, generally constitutes an
impermissible basis for adverse employment actions. The Supreme Court
discussed the improper evaluation of a government employee's political
affiliation in employment actions in Elrod v. Burns:33
The Elrod plaintiffs were Republican non-civil service employees
in the Cook County, Illinois sheriff's office who were dismissed or
threatened with dismissal following the election of a Democratic
sheriff.... [T]he Supreme Court held that, as a general rule, the
practice of dismissing public employees for political patronage
reasons violates the First Amendment.34
The Supreme Court recognized that "if the government could deny a
benefit to a person because of his constitutionally protected [political]
speech or associations, his exercise of those freedoms would in effect be
penalized and inhibited."35 The Court did create one exception to this
prohibition on considering employees' political beliefs in employment ac-
tions regarding government employees: government employers may
consider their employees' political views or statements in those limited
circumstances where the political orientation is necessary for the effective
performance of the specific policy-making position.36
In 1990, the Supreme Court, in Rutan v. Republican Party of Illinois,37
again addressed the issue of considering government employees' political
beliefs in employment actions, this time "with respect to former and cur-
rent low-level public employees . . . who alleged a deprivation of their
First Amendment rights because they were deprived of various employ-
ment opportunities including promotions, transfers, and recalls because
they did not support the prevailing political party."38 The Supreme Court
endorsed its previous ruling by holding that although these employees
were not legally entitled to positive employment benefits such as promo-
tions, the "denial of them based on political affiliation or support is an
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. 427 U.S. 347 (1976).
34. Regan v. Boogertman, 791 F. Supp. 57, 59 (E.D.N.Y. 1992) (citing Elrod v. Burns, 427
U.S. at 360).
35. Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 597 (1972).
36. Elrod, 427 U.S. at 372-73; see Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507, 518 (1980).
37. 497 U.S. 62 (1990).
38. Boogertman, 791 F. Supp. at 59.
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impermissible infringement on the First Amendment rights of public
employees. "39
In fact, courts have held that even membership in communist (much
less liberal or conservative) organizations alone could not disqualify gov-
ernment employment. For example, one court held invalid a Veterans
Administration hospital's inquiry into whether a resident ever belonged
to a communist organization or even advocated the violent overthrow of
the United States government.40 The court held "there is no indication
that his political associations, let alone his beliefs, will have any effect
whatsoever on his ability or willingness to meet his professional and ethi-
cal responsibilities for the care and treatment of patients with whom he
will come into contact."41
Courts have similarly recognized that private employers can be held
liable for wrongful termination when those employers consider political
viewpoint in employment decisions. For example, in Novosel v. Nation-
wide Ins. Co.,42 the Third Circuit in a diversity action upheld the validity of
a state cause of action by an employee asserting wrongful termination
based on his refusal to support the employer's political agenda.43
Indeed, Congress also pursued similar policies when it legislated the
employment rules for the District of Columbia's private nonprofit "Legal
Services Corporation, . . . [which] provid[es] financial support for legal
assistance in non[-]criminal proceedings or matters to persons financially
unable to afford legal assistance."44 In doing so, Congress required that
"[no] political test or political qualification shall be used in selecting, ap-
pointing, promoting, or taking any other personnel action with respect to
any officer, agent, or employee of the Corporation."45 Unsurprisingly,
then, when one employee of the Legal Services Corporation sued the Cor-
poration "assert[ing] that [] new conservative board members . . . re-
placed liberal officers of the Corporation with conservative[s] . . . [and]
terminated hi[m],"46 the federal district court handling the matter re-
manded the case to state court for consideration of this claim as an ele-
ment in the plaintiff's private state causes of action for wrongful
termination.a
III. BAR ADMISSIONS
The accusation and substantiation of the appellation "racist" gener-
ally disqualifies candidates applying to a state bar. The designation as a
"liberal" or "conservative," in contrast, does not carry such negative
effects.
39. Id. at 59-60 (citing Rutan v. Republican Party of Illinois, 497 U.S. 62 at 72-74).
40. Shapiro v. Roudebush, 413 F. Supp. 1177 (D. Mass. 1976).
41. Id. at 1181.
42. 721 F.2d 894 (3d Cir. 1983).
43. Id. at 895-99.
44. 42 U.S.C. § 2996b(a) (2000).
45. 42 U.S.C. § 2996d(b)(2) (2000).
46. Hedges v. Legal Services Corp., 663 F. Supp. 300, 301 (N.D. Cal. 1987).
47. Id. at 305.
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Would-be lawyers have been rejected admission to the profession for
being deemed racist: "Mr. Hale, who graduated from law school and
passed the bar examination, was rejected by the Illinois Bar['s] [ I Com-
mittee on Character and Fitness last December. The panel said his racist
activities demonstrated that he did not have the fitness of character to
qualify as a lawyer."48 Hale did not advocate violence, but outwardly made
racist comments and advocated racist policies.9 Both the Illinois Su-
preme Court and the United States Supreme Court declined to hear
Hale's appeal of the Illinois bar's decision.0 He then filed a Section 1983
action, which was denied by the district and circuit court.51 The accurate
label of "racist" prevented Hale from practicing law.
In contrast, the Supreme Court in Law Students Civil Rights Research
Council, Inc. v. Wadmond52 held that New York employed a valid process
for admission to the state bar because there was, inter alia, "no showing of
an intent to penalize political beliefs."53 Indeed, even during the height of
the Cold War the Supreme Court, in Konigsberg v. State Bar,54 recognized
that mere political belief-including membership in the Communist
party-alone does not suffice to deny admission to the bar. The case
reveals that
Konigsberg would not be rejected for admission to the bar merely
because he might be found to be a member of the Communist
Party, but only after the Committee made an evaluation of Konigs-
berg's knowledge of the organization's purposes [to violently
overthrow the government] and his intent to pursue them.55
Given that a bar applicant seeks "admission to a profession dedicated to
the peaceful and reasoned settlement of disputes between men, and between
a man and his government,56 unlike question regarding political beliefs,
"a State is constitutionally entitled to make [ I an inquiry [about the sup-
port for the violent overthrow of the government] of an applicant."57
IV. PEREMPTORY CHALLENGES IN JURY SELECTION
The exercise of peremptory juror strikes by counsel based on those
attorneys' racist views violates the Constitution, while the Constitution
provides no similar bar for strikes based on political views. This contrast
further highlights the stark difference between the label "racist" versus
the labels "conservative" and "liberal."
48. Mike Allen, A Question of Character; Beyond the Bar Exam, N.Y. TIMES, July 11, 1999,
available at http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9F05E2DA123CF932
A25754COA96F958260.
49. Hale v. Comm. on Character & Fitness for Ill., 335 F.3d 678, 679 (7th Cir. 2003).
50. Id. at 681.
51. Id.
52. Law Students Civil Rights Research Council, Inc. v. Wadmond, 401 U.S. 154 (1971)
(quoting Konigsberg v. State Bar, 366 U.S. 36 (1961)).
53. Id. at 163 (quoting Konigsberg v. State Bar, 366 U.S. 36 (1961)).
54. 366 U.S. 36 (1961).
55. Shapiro v. Roudebush, 413 F. Supp. 1177, 1181 (Mass. App. Div. 1976) (emphasis
added).
56. Law Students Civil Rights Research Council, Inc., 401 U.S. at 166 (emphasis added).
57. Id.
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Historically, the use of peremptory challenges allowed parties to re-
move prospective jurors without giving any reason for their removal.5s
These challenges had been one of the last refuges of generally unchecked
behavior by attorneys. "[I1n the 1980s[, however, c]ritics claimed that
white prosecutors used their peremptory challenges to remove African
Americans from the jury when the criminal defendant was also African
American."59 The Supreme Court tackled this issue in Batson v. Ken-
tucky,6o where
Petitioner, a black man, was indicted in Kentucky on charges
of second-degree burglary and receipt of stolen goods. On the first
day of trial in Jefferson Circuit Court, the judge conducted voir dire
examination of the venire, excused certain jurors for cause, and
permitted the parties to exercise peremptory challenges.61
The case revolved around the concern that "[tihe [white] prosecutor
used his peremptory challenges to strike all four black persons on the
venire, and a jury composed only of white persons was selected."62 The
defense challenged the prosecutor's removal of the black veniremen, al-
leging that such action violated the defendant's Sixth and Fourteenth
Amendment rights to a jury drawn from a cross-section of the commu-
nity.63 During the trial, the judge "observed that the parties were entitled
to use their peremptory challenges to 'strike anybody they want to.' "64
The Supreme Court held that prosecutors cannot make race-based
peremptory strikes of jurors regardless of the "strategic goal" pursued.65
The evil redressed was that of prosecutors' improperly ascribing a predis-
58. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 245 (abridged 8th ed. 2004).
59. Id.; see Georgia v. McCullom, 505 U.S. 42, 50 (1992) ("Until Edmonson, the cases
decided by this Court that presented the problem of racially discriminatory per-
emptory challenges involved assertions of discrimination by a prosecutor.").
60. 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
61. Id. at 82-83.
62. Id. at 83.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. See id. at 89.
More than a century ago, the Court decided that the State denies a black defen-
dant equal protection of the laws when it puts him on trial before a jury from
which members of his race have been purposefully excluded. [In] Strauder v.
West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1880)[, we] . . . laid the foundation for the Court's
unceasing efforts to eradicate racial discrimination in the procedures used to
select the venire from which individual jurors are drawn. In Strauder, the Court
explained that the central concern of the recently ratified Fourteenth Amend-
ment was to put an end to governmental discrimination on account of
race.... Exclusion of black citizens from service as jurors constitutes a primary
example of the evil the Fourteenth Amendment was designed to cure.
Id. at 85 (citations omitted). The Court, in Lockhart v. McCree, later emphasized that
the harm is not only to the litigants, but also to society itself:
The exclusion from jury service of large groups of individuals not on the basis
of their inability to serve as jurors, but on the basis of some immutable charac-
teristic such as race, gender, or ethnic background, undeniably gave rise to an
"appearance of unfairness." ... [Sluch exclusion improperly deprive[s] mem-
bers of these often historically disadvantaged groups of their right as citizens to
serve on juries in criminal cases.
476 U.S. 162, 175 (1986); see also Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 413 (1991).
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position to potential African American jurors based solely on their race.
The prosecutor stereotyped black jurors as unable to see beyond their
own race and make rational decisions. This conduct exemplified racist
behavior on the part of the prosecutor. 66 The Court ruled that this racial
discrimination violated the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection
Clause.67 Thereafter, the Court extended the prohibition on the racist use
of peremptory challenges to private parties in civil trials.68
In 1992, one important issue involving peremptory challenges re-
mained unresolved by the Supreme Court-the exercise of peremptory
challenges by criminal defendants. The inquiry here was whether crimi-
nal defendants-imbued with the Constitutional protections afforded no
other actors proceeding through the judicial system in America-could
exercise race-based peremptory challenges. The Supreme Court, in Geor-
gia v. McCullom,69 said no.
The Court began its analysis by declaring that "[flor more than a cen-
tury, this Court consistently and repeatedly has reaffirmed that racial dis-
crimination by the State in jury selection offends the Equal Protection
Clause."70 McCollum contains instructive facts: the white defendants
were charged with assaulting two African-Americans, and "[b]efore jury
selection began, the prosecution moved to prohibit [defendants] from ex-
ercising peremptory challenges in a racially discriminatory manner. The
State explained that it expected to show that the victims' race was a factor
in the alleged assault."'71
66. The Supreme Court rightly rejected the idea that blacks could be excluded from
juries on the assertion that, simply because they are black, they must harbor biases
against whites. The Court held that "we may not accept as a defense to racial dis-
crimination the very stereotype the law condemns." Powers, 499 U.S. at 410. The
Court had previously held that "[in our heterogeneous society policy as well as
constitutional considerations militate against the divisive assumption as a Per se
rule that justice in a court of law may turn upon the pigmentation of skin, the acci-
dent of birth, or the choice of religion." Ristaino v. Ross, 424 U.S. 589, 596 n.8 (1976).
And the Court later "reaffirm[ed] [I that the exercise of a peremptory challenge
must not be based on either the race of the juror or the racial stereotypes held by the
party." Georgia v. McCullom, 505 U.S. at 44.
67. Batson, 476 U.S. at 89.
68. Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614 (1991).
69. 505 U.S. 42 (1992).
70. Id. at 44 ("Last Term this Court held that racial discrimination in a civil litigant's
exercise of peremptory challenges also violates the Equal Protection Clause").
71. Id. at 44-45.
According to the State, counsel for respondents had indicated a clear intention
to use peremptory strikes in a racially discriminatory manner, arguing that the
circumstances of their case gave them the right to exclude African-American
citizens from participating as jurors in the trial. Observing that 43 percent of the
county's population is African-American, the State contended that, if a statisti-
cally representative panel is assembled for jury selection, 18 of the potential 42
jurors [from the available pool chosen for each petit jury] would be African-
American. With 20 peremptory challenges, respondents therefore would be
able to remove all the African-American potential jurors. Relying on Bat-
son.. .the Sixth Amendment, and the Georgia Constitution, the State sought an
order providing that, if it succeeded in making out a prima facie case of racial
discrimination by respondents, the latter would be required to articulate a ra-
cially neutral explanation for peremptory challenges.
Id. at 45 (citations omitted).
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Thus, in contrast to the Batson-type cases, here the defendants were
white-rather than black-and the defense counsel-rather than the pros-
ecutor-desired to exclude jurors based on race. While those McCollum
facts contrast with Batson, the facts in common are more telling: in both
cases whites wanted to exclude blacks from jury service based on the
whites' stereotyping of blacks' views and actions. That is, the whites
sought to exclude blacks because of the whites' racist views. In both cases
the whites assumed that blacks could not and would not provide a fair
verdict-but, rather, would either (1) vote to acquit black defendants
merely because they also are black (Batson-type cases) or (2) would vote
to convict white defendants merely because the victims were black and
the defendants were white (McCullom-type cases). This is racist and
wrong, and the Court said so: "Just as public confidence in criminal jus-
tice is undermined by a conviction in a trial where racial discrimination
has occurred in jury selection, so is public confidence undermined where
a defendant, assisted by racially discriminatory peremptory strikes, ob-
tains an acquittal."72
While constitutional jurisprudence prohibits decision-making based
on racist beliefs, it unquestionably permits exercising peremptory chal-
lenges based on political biases. For example, in State v. Morton,T3 the
New Jersey Supreme Court held that if the defendant did not want two
decidedly conservative pro-death penalty jurors seated due to the defense
counsel's bias as to these jurors' impartiality, the defendant could simply
have exercised his peremptory challenges.74 Here, like the race-based
peremptory challenges discussed above, counsel ascribed an improper
predisposition to the jurors-but this time based on the jurors' political
views rather than their race. The bias in this instance was the implied
belief that pro-death penalty jurors would automatically vote to convict
notwithstanding guilt. While the ascribed predisposition was not inher-
ently valid-as evidenced by the discussion of employing peremptory
challenges rather than those for cause-the court accurately reasoned that
the attorney could, nonetheless, freely employ his political-orientation
bias against these jurors.
Political-view discrimination by attorneys in jury selection is simply
not considered the evil that race discrimination is in the same context.
Batson and its progeny rightly reflect the notion that racism is a unique
evil that must be eradicated. And these cases demonstrate the singular
seriousness with which the Supreme Court, our legal and political sys-
tem, and our society in general address accusations of racist behavior.
In addition, the Supreme Court has shown particular attention to en-
suring that jurors themselves--rather than the attorneys who chose them--
also do not harbor racist views. The Supreme Court held that in certain
circumstances courts must voir dire on the issue of racial bias of jurors.
No such concern exists for the presence of liberal or conservative jurors
and their potential for affecting the litigation's outcome.
72. Id. at 50.
73. 155 N.J. 383 (N.J. 1998).
74. Id. at 459-60.
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In Ham v. South Carolina,75 the Supreme Court reviewed the trial
judge's actions in a case in which a black civil rights worker was on trial
for the possession of marijuana.76 At the trial, his defense "was that law
enforcement officers were 'out to get him' because of his civil rights activ-
ities, and that he had been framed on the drug charge."77 The defendant
received an 18-month sentence, and he appealed the trial court's failure to
interrogate the jurors on the subject of racial prejudice.78 The Supreme
Court held that the Fourteenth Amendment required such an inquiry
under the circumstances of that case:79
Since one of the purposes of the Due Process Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment is to insure these 'essential demands of fair-
ness,'. . .and since a principal purpose of the adoption of the
Fourteenth Amendment was to prohibit the States from invidi-
ously discriminating on the basis of race, we think that the Four-
teenth Amendment required the judge in this case to interrogate
the jurors upon the subject of racial prejudice.80
Telling of the uniqueness of racism and the charge thereof was the
Court's response to the defendant's assertion that he had a right to inquire
as to whether any jurors held a bias against those sporting facial hair, as
defendant also wore a beard. The court, in rejecting that idea, declared:
While we cannot say that prejudice against people with beards
might not have been harbored by one or more of the potential
jurors in this case, this is the beginning and not the end of the
inquiry as to whether the Fourteenth Amendment required the
trial judge to interrogate the prospective jurors about such possi-
ble prejudice.81
The Court concluded:
Given the traditionally broad discretion accorded to the trial judge
in conducting voir dire, and our inability to constitutionally distin-
guish possible prejudice against beards from a host of other possi-
ble similar prejudices, we do not believe [defendant's]
constitutional rights were violated when the trial judge refused to
put this question.a2
Indeed, the contrast in language that the Court used for addressing rac-
ists, when compared to what it used for beards, is telling:
The inquiry as to racial prejudice derives its constitutional stature
from [ ] firmly established precedent . . . and [ ] a principal pur-
pose as well as from the language of those who adopted the Four-
teenth Amendment. The trial judge's refusal to inquire as to
75. 409 U.S. 524 (1973).
76. Id. at 526.
77. Id. at 525.
78. Id. at 526.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 527 (citations omitted).
81. Id. at 527-28.
82. Id. at 528.
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particular bias against beards . . . does not reach the level of a
constitutional violation.83
The Court, however, has been nuanced-if not simply hesitant-in its
application of this principle. For example,
In Aldridge v. United States, counsel for a black defendant sought
to have the Court put a question to the jury as to whether any of
them might be prejudiced against the defendant because of his
race. [The Court] held that it was reversible error for the Court not
to have put such a question, saying "the Court failed to ask any
question which could be deemed to cover the subject." More re-
cently, in Rosales-Lopez v. United States, we held that such an
inquiry as to racial or ethnic prejudice need not be made in every
case, but only where the defendant was accused of a violent crime
and the defendant and the victim were members of different racial
or ethnic groups .... "Because the obligation to empanel an im-
partial jury lies in the first instance with the trial judge, and be-
cause he must rely largely on his immediate perceptions, federal
judges have been accorded ample discretion in determining how
best to conduct the voir dire."84
While Hamm and Aldridge required the inquiry into racial animus, and
Rosales-Lopez expressed limitations of that rule, in
Ristaino v. Ross, [the Supreme Court] held that the Constitution
does not require a state-court trial judge to question prospective
jurors as to racial prejudice in every case where the races of the
defendant and the victim differ, but in Turner v. Murray, [the Su-
preme Court] held that in a capital case involving a charge of mur-
der of a white person by a black defendant such questions must be
asked.85
The Supreme Court recognized that "the possibility of racial prejudice
against a black defendant charged with a violent crime against a white
person is sufficiently real that the Fourteenth Amendment requires that
inquiry be made into racial prejudice,"86 although "the trial court retains
great latitude in deciding what questions should be asked on voir dire."87
The Court continued that
[iun Aldridge and Ham we held that the subject of possible racial
bias must be 'covered' by the questioning of the trial court in the
course of its examination of potential jurors, but we were careful
not to specify the particulars by which this could be done. We did
not, for instance, require questioning of individual jurors about
facts or experiences that might have led to racial bias."88
83. Id. (citations omitted).
84. Mu'Min v. Virginia, 500 U.S. 415, 422-23 (1991) (citing Aldridge v. United States, 283
U.S. 308 (1931); Rosalez-Lopez v. United States, 451 U.S. 182 (1981)).
85. Id. at 423-24 (citing Ristaino v. Ross, 424 U.S. 589 (1976)).
86. Id. at 424.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 431.
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In United States v. King,89 the Southern District of New York further
highlighted the importance of asking potential jurors probing questions
to determine whether they have any racial biases. Regarding "the deli-
cate area of possible racial bias" of jurors, the court in a criminal case
against Don King, the well-known boxing promoter, stated that "[it is no
doubt a difficult thing for any person to admit to any degree of racial
bias, but to do so for publication might well require what the theologians
used to call heroic virtue. The importance of voir dire in uncovering racial
bias would be hard to overestimate."90
The court's language in King embodies the critical point presented
throughout this paper-that racist behavior and the appellation "racist"
are dreadful. The former proves terrible for both racists and the remain-
der of society, because racists themselves suffer from the control of that
evil and society suffers by having to cope with it. The latter is awful (but
justified) for the racists, because they are "outed" for their evil. Indeed,
that explains the court's emphasis on the difficulty of disclosing such bias
and the demand for judicial intervention to ensure such disclosure.
Unfortunately, not all courts have been so vigorous in the application
of the principle of ferreting out racism among jurors. In Sterling v.
Dretke,91 the Fifth Circuit upheld the district court's conclusion that coun-
sel's failure to inquire as to racial animus of a juror that the attorney knew
had used racial epithets was not, under the circumstances in the case,
ineffective assistance of counsel.92 In Sterling, the juror in issue used the
term "nig**rs "93 to refer to African-Americans at the time of trial and af-
ter.94 Apparently, the defense counsel knew the witness and believed that
their relationship would inure to the benefit of the defendant and that the
juror was not a racist notwithstanding his use of the racial slur.95 The
Fifth Circuit upheld the trial court's determination that the defense attor-
ney's actions fell within the sphere of appropriate "strategy." Appar-
ently, the ethically-questionable strategy of relying on a personal
relationship-seemingly undisclosed-coupled with the trial attorney's
untested perception that the juror was not bigoted was a sufficient "strat-
egy" to trump the obligation to merely inquire into the potential racial
animus of a prospective juror.96
89. 911 F. Supp. 113 (S.D.N.Y.1995).
90. Id. at 117.
91. Sterling v. Dretke, 117 Fed. App'x. 328, 330 (5th Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 544 U.S. 1053
(2005).
92. Id. at 333.
93. This is how the Fifth Circuit wrote the word. It is worthy to note that the Fifth
Circuit found the use of term so terrible that it could not even quote it, but insuffi-
ciently harmful under the circumstances to warrant reversal.
94. Id. at 331.
95. Id. at 331-32. ("Walther also stated he has some very close friends who are African-
American; using the term 'nig**r' did not make him a racist; and he did not consider
himself to be a racist.").
96. Id. at 332. ("While Dunn did not question any potential jurors about racial bias, he
stated this decision rested on his belief that he very seldom receives truthful an-
swers."). The Supreme Court has rejected similar logic under different circum-
stances: "Dispensing with confrontation because testimony is obviously reliable is
akin to dispensing with jury trial because a defendant is obviously guilty. This is
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V. DEFAMATION
Defamation law "aims at protecting reputation and good name
against false and derogatory comments." 97 To prove a defamation claim,
a plaintiff must show that someone communicated a statement that
"would diminish the esteem in which the plaintiff is held."98
Civil and religious law have long recognized redress for harmful
statements about another: "In the medieval English law, oral statements
demeaning to others were punished as sin in the Church courts."99 Dur-
ing the early to middle part of the first common-era millennium, the
penultimately controlling Jewish legal text-the Talmud-described three
exclusive circumstances that will prevent a soul from elevating out of
Gehinnom (roughly equivalent to Hell100): (1) adultery,101 (2) invasion of
privacy and other public humiliation, and (3) the making of derogatory
comments (e.g., defamation).02 The Talmud characterizes the latter two as
verbal ona'ah (roughly, wrongdoing),103 which the Talmud discusses along
side of monetary ona'ah-essentially fraud.104 Indeed, "[vierbal ona'ah is a
greater sin than monetary ona'ah."105 It "is tantamount to assassination,
since it destroys his social status and personal honor."106 The Torah107-
not what the Sixth Amendment prescribes." Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36,
62 (2004).
97. 2 DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS 1117 (2001).
98. Id. at 1120.
99. Id. at 1117.
100. GEMARA, TRACTATE BEITZAH, SCHOTTENSTEIN EDITION Glossary (1997). See Isaiah
66:24.
101. Of these three categories of sin, only adultery is prohibited in the Ten Command-
ments. Exodus 20:1-14. Adultery is a capital offense in Biblical law. TANACH, STONE
EDITION 184 (1996).
102. ADIN STEINSALTZ, TALMUD, STEINSALTZ EDITION, VOLUME II, 226 (1990) (referencing
the harm caused by specific wrongs including defamation, the Talmud teaches that
"[elven if the wrongdoer tries to atone for his sin by compensating the victim, the
anguish he caused [by, in this instance, defamation] can never be completely un-
done."). The Talmud offers as an example of defamation the mere suggestion that
had a person been more scrupulous he might not have become ill or his children
might not have died because that "is tantamount to accusing the sufferer or the
deceased of being a sinner." Id. at 225. The proscription on verbal ona'ah is so strict
that "not only are outright insults forbidden, but so are remarks made facetiously, if
they are likely to cause others distress." Id.
103. Id. at 223 (describing verbal ona'ah as "anguish... caused to other people by hurt-
ing their feelings .... [T]wo types of transgression are subsumed under th[is] cate-
gory . . . (1) Causing a person financial loss through one's words, and (2) putting
another person to shame."). Id.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 226.
106. Id. The Talmud further explains: "If someone overcharges or underpays, he can
recompense the victim by simply paying the difference. But verbal ona'ah is not
subject to [correction through] restitution. Even if the wrongdoer tries to atone for
his sin by compensating the victim, the anguish he caused can never be completely
undone." Id. The Talmud further teaches that while "[e]very sin is [generally] pun-
ished by the hand of a messenger, and not directly by the hand of [G-d], [there is
an] except[ion] for the sin of ona'ah, for which [G-d] himself exacts immediate pun-
ishment.... [G-d] takes a special interest in avenging the[se] sins." Id. at 232.
107. The Torah refers to the first five books of the Old Testament, customarily viewed by
Jews and Christians as dictated by G-d to Moses on Mt. Sinai after the Jewish people
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the highest source of Jewish law-provides for earthly punishment for
defamation in the form of financial damages.108 In modern civil law, defa-
mation is actionable in every state. 109
Labeling someone a "racist" can be defamatory. In MacElree v. Phila-
delphia Newspapers Inc.,11o the defendant newspaper "reported on a brawl
at Lincoln University."' The article referred to the then district attorney
and stated that "Lincoln's lawyer accused [the D.A.] of 'electioneering-
[and that the D.A. was] the David Duke of Chester County running for
office by attacking Lincoln."'112 The court in MacElree articulated that
these accusations of racism may be actionable as defamation: "Although
[mere] accusations of racism have been held not to be actionable defama-
tion, it cannot be said that every such accusation is not capable of defama-
tory meaning as a matter of law."113 As the New Jersey Supreme Court
held in Ward v. Zelikovsky,114 non-actionable assertions of "racism" do not
imply any supporting factual basis--thus constituting mere opinion; in
contrast, accusations of "racism" implying or accompanied by reasonably
specific statements that are capable of objective proof of falsity are action-
able.115 The Ward court articulated the fact-opinion dichotomy concerning
accusations of racism (the "fact-opinion test"116):
left the captivity of 210 years of slavery in Egypt. See Jewish Virtual Library, The
Written Law (The Torah), http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/Judaism/
TheWritten Law.html; Commentary by Rashi (Rabenu Shlomo Yitzchaki, the Jew-
ish sage of the early second millennium of the common era) Exodus 12:40-41, availa-
ble at http://www.chabad.org/library/bible-cdo/aid/9873/showrashi/true/
jewish/Chapter-12.htm.
108. Deuteronomy 22:13-19 (fine of 100 silver shekels).
109. 2 DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS 1119 (2001).
110. 544 Pa. 117 (Pa. 1996).
111. Merriweather v. Phila. Newspapers, Inc., 61 Pa. D. & C.4th 423, 436-37 (2002).
112. Id. at 437.
113. MacElree, 544 Pa. at 127.
114. 136 N.J. 516, 539 (1994).
115. Id.
116. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 566 (1974) sets forth the considerations of the
fact-opinion test:
A defamatory communication may consist of a statement in the form of an
opinion, but a statement of this nature is actionable only if it implies the allega-
tion of undisclosed defamatory facts as the basis for the opinion.
.... A simple expression of opinion based on disclosed or assumed nondefam-
atory facts is not itself sufficient for an action of defamation, no matter how
unjustified and unreasonable the opinion may be or how derogatory it is. But
an expression of opinion that is not based on disclosed or assumed facts and
therefore implies that there are undisclosed facts on which the opinion is based,
is treated differently. The difference lies in the effect upon the recipient of the
communication. In the first case, the communication itself indicates to him that
there is no defamatory factual statement. In the second, it does not, and if the
recipient draws the reasonable conclusion that the derogatory opinion ex-
pressed in the comment must have been based on undisclosed defamatory
facts, the defendant is subject to liability. The defendant cannot insist that the
undisclosed facts were not defamatory but that he unreasonably formed the
derogatory opinion from them. This is like the case of a communication subject
to more than one meaning. As stated in § 563, the meaning of a communication
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Whether an accusation of bigotry is actionable depends on
whether the statement appeared to be supported by reasonably
specific facts that are capable of objective proof of truth or falsity.
The statement might explicitly refer to those specific facts or be
made in such manner or under such circumstances as would fairly
lead a reasonable listener to conclude that he or she had knowl-
edge of specific facts supporting the conclusory accusation. For
example, a claim of bigotry could include claims that the se-
lected person had engaged in specific acts such as making racist
statements, failing to associate with or to act with courtesy toward
people of a particular race, denying another employment or ad-
vancement because of race or religion, or posting signs that car-
ried a racist message.11 7
The court in MacElree essentially applied the fact-opinion test when it
held that "[t]he statement we are presented with here could be inter-
preted as more than a simple accusation of racism .... [T]he statement
could be construed to mean that appellant was acting in a racist manner
in his official capacity as district attorney."118
As the court stated,
a communication is defamatory if it tends so to harm the reputa-
tion of another as to lower him in the estimation of the community
or to deter third persons from associating or dealing with him. A
charge of racism clearly could have such an effect on the individ-
ual so charged.119
The court concluded that
[w]here such a possibility exists, it is up to the jury as fact finder
to determine its existence. This is not to say that every accusation
of racism is defamatory. Accordingly, it remains "the function of
the court to determine whether the challenged publication is capa-
ble of a defamatory meaning."20
In another defamation case involving the accusation of "racism," a
New York court applied the fact-opinion test to hold that the use of the
term was actionable because of the presence of defamatory facts that
could be proven false.121 The court held that the defendant's assertion
"that plaintiff's office cubicle contained a statuette of a black man hang-
ing from a white noose, was false as alleged by plaintiff, [such that] de-
fendants' views premised on such statement, published under the
is that which the recipient correctly, or mistakenly but reasonably, understands
that it was intended to express.
It is the function of the court to determine whether an expression of opinion is
capable of bearing a defamatory meaning because it may reasonably be under-
stood to imply the assertion of undisclosed facts that justify the expressed opin-
ion about the plaintiff or his conduct, and the function of the jury to determine
whether that meaning was attributed to it by the recipient of the
communication.
117. Zelikovsky, 136 N.J. at 539.
118. MacElree, 544 Pa. at 126.
119. Id. at 127 (internal quotations removed).
120. Id.
121. Como v. Riley, 287 A.D.2d 416, 416 (N.Y. App. Div. 2001).
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heading 'Racism,' are not immune from redress for defamation as non-
actionable statements of opinion.122
Moreover, the mere use of the phrase "in my opinion," will not con-
vert actionable words into protected speech. As the Supreme Court
stated in Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co.:123
If a speaker says, "In my opinion John Jones is a liar," he im-
plies a knowledge of facts which lead to the conclusion that Jones
told an untruth. Even if the speaker states the facts upon which
he bases his opinion, if those facts are either incorrect or incom-
plete, or if his assessment of them is erroneous, the statement may
still imply a false assertion of fact. Simply couching such state-
ments in terms of opinion does not dispel these implications; and
the statement, "In my opinion Jones is a liar," can cause as much
damage to reputation as the statement, "Jones is a liar." As Judge
Friendly aptly stated: "[It] would be destructive of the law of libel
if a writer could escape liability for accusations of [defamatory
conduct] simply by using, explicitly or implicitly, the words 'I
think."' It is worthy of note that at common law, even the privi-
lege of fair comment did not extend to "a false statement of fact,
whether it was expressly stated or implied from an expression of
opinion.124
This is not to say that the Democrat-Gazette's position is without any
support. Indeed, in discussing the fact-opinion test, the Seventh Circuit
presented the position that the Democrat-Gazette essentially posits. In
Stevens v. Tillman,125 the court held that:
Accusations of "racism" no longer are [alone] "obviously and
naturally harmful." The word has been watered down by
overuse, becoming common coin in political discourse .... For-
merly a "racist" was a believer in the superiority of one's own
race, often a supporter of slavery or segregation, or a fomenter of
hatred among the races .... Politicians sometimes use the term
much more loosely, as referring to anyone (not of the speaker's
race) who opposes the speaker's political goals--on the "ratio-
nale" that the speaker espouses only what is good for the jurisdic-
tion (or the audience), and since one's opponents have no cause to
oppose what is beneficial, their opposition must be based on race.
The term used this way means only: "He is neither for me nor of
our race; and I invite you to vote your race." . . . That may be an
unfortunate brand of politics, but it also drains the term of its for-
mer, decidedly opprobrious, meaning. The term has acquired in-
termediate meanings too. The speaker may use "she is a racist" to
mean "she is condescending to me, which must be because of my
race because there is no other reason to condescend" - a reaction
122. Id.
123. 497 U.S. 1 (1990).
124. Id. at 14 (citations omitted, citing, inter alia, RESTATEMENT (SEcOND) OF TORTS, brack-
ets in original).
125. 855 F.2d 394 (7th Cir. 1988).
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that attaches racial connotations to what may be an inflated opin-
ion of one's self - or to mean "she thinks all black mothers are on
welfare, which is stereotypical." Meanings of this sort fit comfort-
ably within the immunity for name-calling.126
While the Democrat-Gazette would undoubtedly find solace in this
portion of Judge Easterbrook's opinion in Stevens, the same Judge under-
standably held later in Taylor v. Carmouche127 that the statement "'Felton is
a racist' is defamatory, and a person who makes an unsupported defama-
tory statement may be penalized without offending the First Amend-
ment."128 Thus, Easterbrook's opinions reflect his recognition of the two
classes of cases involving the accusation that someone is a "racist"--one
class being defamatory under the law, the other not.
The problem with the Democrat-Gazette's view, therefore, lies not in
the fact that it ignores the law, but rather in its failure to account for the
other half of the equation-those instances in which accusations of racism
suggest the existence of or present defamatory facts. A benign explana-
tion for the newspaper's omission may be the limited space available for
any one editorial-coupled with the bounded attention of a busy reader-
ship. And with an able paper such as the Democrat-Gazette, this conclu-
sion may suffice. I will posit one possible additional motivation,
however. Newspapers are quite often the subject of defamation lawsuits.
By not only acknowledging, but fostering, the Seventh Circuit's observa-
tion that "[t]he word ["racist"] has been watered down by overuse, be-
coming common coin in political discourse,"129 the Democrat-Gazette
could save itself and other newspapers exposure to significant liability
and damages. This is not to say that the editorial board intentionally pur-
sued this strategy, but its conclusion may result from "unconscious
bias."130
In contrast to the potential liability for the charge of "racism," no
cause of action exists for falsely labeling someone a "liberal" or a "con-
servative." Indeed, I have found no cases where a plaintiff alleged that
the appellation "liberal" or "conservative" was defamatory. This in itself
is quite telling.
126. Id. at 402.
127. 214 F.3d 788 (7th Cir. 2000). See supra notes 30-32 and accompanying text for a
further discussion of the case.
128. Id. at 793.
129. Id.
130. For a discussion of the theory of "unconscious bias" see Sara R. Benson, Reviving the
Disparate Impact Doctrine to Combat Unconscious Discrimination: a Study of Chin v.
Runnels, 31 T. MARSHALL L. REv. 43 (2005) ("[T]he majority of discrimination today
results from unconscious biases and preferences. Psychological and sociological
data suggest that unconscious discrimination occurs with high frequency in this
country."); Kristof, supra note 3 ("[T]he evidence is overwhelming that most Ameri-
cans have unconscious biases .... ). For an introduction to this topic in the context
of Critical Race Theory, see Dorothy A. Brown, Fighting Racism in the Twenty-First
Century, 61 WASH. & LEE L. REV 1485, 1490 (2004) ("Unconscious racism is today's
enemy.").
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The 1935 Delaware case of Snavely v. Booth131 offers some further in-
sight into this inquiry. In Snavely, the superintendent of a school district
sued certain members of the board of education for defamation stemming
from the latter's accusations that the superintendent advocated the teach-
ing of contraception and the rejection of religious-based approaches to
unplanned pregnancies of school children.132 While this view would be
considered liberal today, it was undoubtedly much more so in the context
of the time-which the court explicated:
A statute of this state requires that at least five verses of the Holy
Bible be read on every school day, and it may well be supposed
that these defendants, being members of the board of education,
conceived that one of the purposes of the statutory requirement is
that morality be taught from the standpoint of Christianity, and
that young children be imbued with that idea of chaste conduct
which the Christian religion teaches, a religion which is part of
our common law. From the viewpoint of the writers of the letter it
would not be in conformity with the intention of the legislature,
nor would it meet with the approval of many parents, to permit
the public schools to be made the breeding grounds for the propa-
gation of ethical opinions cherished by the biologically minded.133
With this in mind, the court held that the accusation of a decidedly
liberal position constituted "a conflict of view, opinion, [or] theory."134
As such, the defendants "were entitled to their opinion that morality is
founded upon rectitude of conduct and purity of life."'135 The court held
that to hold "[o]therwise, [would result in] court calendars [] be[ing]
crowded with defamation actions between ... conservative and liberal, for
the vindication of theories and opinions, and verdicts of juries will be
arrived at from prejudice and not from fact."136
While the traditional political labels of "liberal" and "conservative"
have not given rise to defamation actions, the Supreme Court has held the
label "communist" can be defamatory: "Respondent also falsely labeled
petitioner a 'Leninist' and a 'Communist-fronter.' These accusations are
generally considered defamatory."137 Indeed, Justice Powell employed
the fact-opinion test in finding defamatory the label of "communist."138
131. 176 A. 649 (Del. 1935).
132. Id. at 653-54.
133. Id. at 654 (citations omitted).
134. Id. at 654.
135. Id. at 653.
136. Id. at 654 (emphasis added).
137. Gertz v. Robert Welch, 418 U.S. 323, 332 n.4 (1974).
138. Id. at 339-40. The Supreme Court further explained in Cianci v. New Times Pub.
Co., 639 F.2d 54, 61-62 (2d Cir. 1980) ("The alleged libels in Gertz, which were
deemed sufficiently 'factual' to support an action for defamation, included ...
charges that he was a 'Leninist' or 'Communist-fronter'. The sort of idea which can
never be false was illustrated by reference to Thomas Jefferson's Inaugural Address,
where the President argued for freedom for those 'who would wish to dissolve this
Union or change its republican form.'") (citations omitted).
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The same analysis applies to accusations on the other extreme of the
political spectrum. In Buckley v. Littell,139 the defendant branded William
Buckley with the terms "fellow traveler" of "fascism" and the "radical
right."140 The court ruled that these "concepts whose content is so debat-
able, loose and varying... are insusceptible to proof of truth or falsity."141
The First Circuit clarified, explaining that "statements that are too vague
to constitute defamation generally fall into the category of epithets, such
as 'communist,' or 'absolute barbarian, lunkhead, meathead, and nut."' 142
In contrast, the Buckley court compared the vague charges of fascism in
that case with a specific factual charge of association with "the Fascisti, or
the Nazis, or the Falangists, or a mythical Fascist Party of America."143
The court implied the latter charge would give rise to a defamation
claim.144
Thus, we see that while political labels in the middle of the spec-
trum-"liberal" and "conservative"-are not subject to defamatory
meaning, labels at the extreme-"communist" and "fascist," like the ex-
treme label of "racist"-may defame, subject to the fact-opinion test. In
fact, we can draw the hopefully uncontroversial conclusion that the more
extreme the label, the more likely it could-and should-give rise to an
actionable defamation claim.
VI. HATE CRIMES
The final area that I analyze to demonstrate the incomparability of the
label "racist" with "liberal" and "conservative" is perhaps the most ob-
vious-hate crimes and penalty enhancements for race-motivated crimes.
Both statutes and penalty guidelines provide for significantly greater
punishment when a crime is committed by someone motivated by ra-
cism-i.e., a racist. No such increase in punishment exists for those who
committed the same crimes when motivated by political beliefs such as
liberal or conservative ideologies.
Many states have hate-crime laws that recognize a separate crime for
acts committed with, inter alia, racist beliefs.45 New York's law is a good
example and, in part, reads:
139. 539 F.2d 882 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1062 (1977).
140. Id. at 894.
141. Id.
142. Stanton v. Metro Corp., 438 F.3d 119, 131 (1st Cir. 2006) (citations omitted). But see
Idema v. Wager, 29 Fed. App'x. 676, 678-679 (2d Cir. 2002) (suggesting that the
epithet of "communist" might survive a motion to dismiss).
143. Buckley, 539 F.2d at 893-94 n.11.
144. See id. It is worth noting that the labels "fascist" and "Nazi," are generally - and
properly - considered the same as "racist." As such, these labels have moved from
political designations to the approbation set out for singular treatment in this
article.
145. Many other states have hate crime statutes or otherwise focus greater attention on
crimes solely because they are motivated by racist thought. See, e.g., 720 ILL. COMP.
STAT. ANN. 5/12-7.1 (2005) ("A person commits hate crime when, by reason of the
actual or perceived race, color, creed, religion, ancestry, gender, sexual orientation,
physical or mental disability, or national origin of another ..., regardless of the
existence of any other motivating factor..., he commits assault, battery, aggravated
assault, misdemeanor theft, criminal trespass.... misdemeanor criminal damage to
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§ 485.05. Hate crimes
1. A person commits a hate crime when he or she commits a speci-
fied offense and either:
(a) intentionally selects the person against whom the offense is
committed or intended to be committed in whole or in substantial
part because of a belief or perception regarding the race, color,
national origin, ancestry, gender, religion, religious practice, age,
disability or sexual orientation of a person, regardless of whether
the belief or perception is correct, or
property, criminal trespass to vehicle . . .[or] real property, mob action or disor-
derly conduct."); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11 § 1304 (1997) ("Any person who commits,
or attempts to commit, any crime as defined by the laws of this State, and who
intentionally . . .[slelects the victim because of the victim's race, religion, color,
disability, sexual orientation, national origin or ancestry, shall be guilty of a hate
crime."); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 22C, § 32 (1992) ("'Hate crime' [is] any crimi-
nal act coupled with overt actions motivated by bigotry and bias including, but not
limited to, a threatened, attempted or completed overt act motivated at least in part
by racial, religious, ethnic, handicap, gender or sexual orientation prejudice, or
which otherwise deprives another person of his constitutional rights by threats, in-
timidation or coercion, or which seek to interfere with or disrupt a person's exercise
of constitutional rights through harassment or intimidation."); CAL. PENAL CODE
§ 422.55 (2004) ("'Hate crime' means a criminal act committed, in whole or in part,
because of one or more of the following actual or perceived characteristics of the
victim: (1) Disability. (2) Gender. (3) Nationality. (4) Race or ethnicity. (5) Religion.
(6) Sexual orientation. (7) Association with a person or group with one or more of
these actual or perceived characteristics."); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 42-28-46 (1994) ("'Hate
crime' means any crime motivated by bigotry and bias, including, but not limited to
threatened, attempted, or completed acts that appear after investigation to have
been motivated by racial, religious, ethnic, sexual orientation, gender or disability
prejudice."); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 1455 (1999) ("Hate-motivated crimes [statute
increases penalties to a] person who commits, causes to be committed or attempts to
commit any crime and whose conduct is maliciously motivated by the victim's ac-
tual or perceived race, color, religion, national origin, sex, ancestry, age, service in
the armed forces of the United States, handicap . . . sexual orientation or gender
identity."); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2927.12 (1986) ("(A) No person shall violate [the
following penal] section[s] . . .by reason of the race, color, religion, or national
origin of another person or group of persons. (B) Whoever violates this section is
guilty of ethnic intimidation. Ethnic intimidation is an offense of the next higher
degree than the offense the commission of which is a necessary element of ethnic
intimidation."); OR. REV. STAT. § 166.165 (2008) ("Two or more persons acting to-
gether commit the crime of intimidation in the first degree, if the persons: (a)(A)
Intentionally, knowingly or recklessly cause physical injury to another person be-
cause of the actors' perception of that person's race, color, religion, sexual orienta-
tion or national origin; or (B) With criminal negligence cause physical injury to
another person by means of a deadly weapon because of the actors' perception of
that person's race, color, religion, sexual orientation or national origin; (b) Intention-
ally, because of the actors' perception of another person's race, color, religion, sexual
orientation or national origin place another person in fear of imminent serious
physical injury; or (c) Commit such acts as would constitute the crime of intimida-
tion in the second degree, if undertaken by one person acting alone."); WASH. REV.
CODE § 9A.36.080 (1993) ("A person is guilty of malicious harassment if he or she
maliciously and intentionally commits one of the following acts because of his or
her perception of the victim's race, color, religion, ancestry, national origin, gender,
sexual orientation, or mental, physical, or sensory handicap").
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(b) intentionally commits the act or acts constituting the offense in
whole or in substantial part because of a belief or perception re-
garding the race, color, national origin, ancestry, gender, religion,
religious practice, age, disability or sexual orientation of a person,
regardless of whether the belief or perception is correct. 1
46
New York v. McDowd147 put this statute to the test. In McDowd, the
defendant "told a real estate agent that if a house for sale on defendant's
street were to be sold to blacks, defendant would bum it down and that
defendant posted numerous flyers of a racist nature including 'Niggers
Beware' and 'KKK.' "148 The court found no constitutional impediment to
imposing a greater penalty for a crime when racist beliefs motivated that
crime.149
Myriad such cases exist. For example, in Missouri v. Callen,150 the de-
fendant was permanently rejected
[f]rom donating at [a local] plasma center for distributing KKK
pamphlets .... [Defendant] continued to visit the plasma center
every three to six months. Every time he went to the center, [he
was] told [] to leave and [he was] not allow[ed] [] to donate
plasma. On each occasion, [defendant] made racist remarks....
He also, on several occasions, wore a KKK hat and displayed KKK
paraphernalia .... [He also] drove a truck with KKK marked on it
and [had] a KKK flag hanging from the antenna .... [Later defen-
dant sent] a racist letter ... on KKK stationery .... 151
The defendant's "conduct ... manifest[ed] his racial animosity .... Thus,
[held the appellate court,]... the trial court could have reasonably found
that Mr. Callen's trespass ... was motivated by ... race."152
146. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 485.05 (2003). Separately, New York has an elevated assault
charge known as aggravated harassment. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 240.30. Several factors
can elevate an ordinary assault to the more serious aggravated version of the crime,
including if the defendant "[s]trikes, shoves, kicks, or otherwise subjects another
person to physical contact, or attempts or threatens to do the same because of a
belief or perception regarding such person's race, color, national origin, ancestry,
gender, religion, religious practice, age, disability or sexual orientation, regardless
of whether the belief or perception is correct." Id. This section has been ruled con-
stitutional, on the grounds that it does not restrict speech but instead "prohibit[s]
violence and physical intimidation based upon bigotry." People v. Miccio, 589
N.Y.S.2d 762 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. 1992).
147. 773 N.Y.S.2d 531 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2004).
148. Id. at 532. In describing the New York hate-crime statute, the court said that
a person commits a 'hate crime' when he commits a 'specified offense' . . . in
whole or substantial part because of a belief or perception regarding the race of
a person, regardless of whether the belief or perception is correct .... [Wihen a
person is convicted of a hate crime . . . the hate crime is deemed to be one
category higher than the specified offense which he committed.
Id. at 532 n.1-2.
149. Id. at 533.
150. 97 S.W.3d 105 (Mo. Ct. App. 2002).
151. Id. at 111.
152. Id. The court previously upheld the constitutionality of the hate-crime statute. Id. at
109.
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Indeed, the breadth of the application of such statutes should not be
underestimated. The defendant in Illinois v. Davis153 yelled "'Nigger, I am
going to kick your black ass,"' before proceeding to beat the victim "liter-
ally, senseless."154 Illinois prosecuted the defendant under its hate crime
statute.155 The court in Davis held that while the defendant's comments
were "reprehensible and per se racist, there is less indication that the as-
sault was motivated by racial animus .... This case may be ... an aggra-
vated battery that is transformed into a hate crime by reason of the
spoken word 'nigger."'156 Nonetheless, the court held that "[t]hese obser-
vations aside, we rule to affirm defendant's conviction."157 Thus, al-
though the charge that the defendant was motivated by racist views
was-according to the court-a weak one, its command sufficed to con-
vict the defendant of the hightened-penalty hate crime.
In addition, in the B.C. case, the Illinois Supreme Court held charges
that the defendants "knowingly committed the offense of disorderly con-
duct" because they "displayed patently offensive depictions of violence
toward African-Americans in such an unreasonable manner as to alarm
and disturb [the victim] and provoke a breach of the peace," sufficient to
state a claim as a "violation of the hate crime statute."158 In this case, the
Illinois Supreme Court held that the victim of the crime need not be, or
perceived to be, a member of the hated group, as long as the perpetrator
was motivated by the requisite racist views in committing the crime.159
153. 674 N.E.2d 895 (Ill. App. Ct. 1997).
154. Id. at 895.
155. Id. at 897.
156. Id. at 898 (emphasis in original).
157. Id. The Court referenced cases from other jurisdictions in discussing the requisite
racial animus to show a hate crime. Those cases also serve well to provide a sam-
pling of the types of behavior that have given rise to criminal liability under hate-
crime statutes: "People v. MacKenzie, 34 Cal. App. 4th 1256, 1264, 1266, 40 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 793, 796-97 (1995) (before brandishing a .45-caliber handgun at a black fam-
ily, white defendant said: 'This is my [f--ing] neighborhood, I'm sick of you
mother [f--ing] bozo niggers; 'Nigger bitch, you're dead'; 'You are just as [f--ed]
as those f--ing nigger dope dealers in Oakland'); People v. Superior Court
(Aishman), 32 Cal. App. 4th 1350 (1993) (group of white men, one tattooed with a
swastika and 'Thank God I'm White,' talk about 'hitting home runs with Mexicans'
before driving to a Hispanic neighborhood and beating three Mexican men with
baseball bats); [Wisconsin v. ] Mitchell, 508 U.S. 476, 480 [(1993)] (After seeing the
movie "Mississippi Burning," a member of a group of young black men said, 'Do
you all feel hyped up to move on some white people?' and 'You all want to [f-k]
somebody up? There goes a white boy; go get him,' before the group beat a white
14-year-old causing brain damage); Richards v. State, 608 So. 2d 917 (Fla. App. 1992)
(before assaulting a black man, white assailant said, 'I am tired of you [f--ing]
niggers being down here. Got a job? Boat people... You niggers down here playing
music and keeping me up); Dobbins v. State, 605 So. 2d 922 (Fla. App. 1992) (group
of 'skin-heads' beat Jewish youth, saying, 'Die Jew boy'); Ayers v. State, 335 Md. 602,
611, 645 A.2d 22, 26 (1994) (group of white men decided to 'go nigger hunting');
People v. Prisinzano, 170 Misc. 2d 525, 648 N.Y.S.2d 267 (1996) (white neighbor
constructed and burned cross on the lawn of the neighboring home as black pro-
spective buyers visit)." Id. at 880 (some citations omitted) (brackets within internal
quotations in original).
158. In re B.C., 680 N.E.2d 1355, 1363 (Ill. 1997). The court did not expressly address the
constitutional issues. Id. at 1364.
159. Id. at 1362.
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The uniqueness of the jurisprudence regarding racists and racist be-
liefs is reflected in an Illinois appellate court's observation in Illinois v.
Buck,160 that the "holding [in B.C.] has never been applied outside the
realm of the hate crime statute."161
In addition to hate crime statutes, many jurisdictions-including the
federal government-allow for sentencing enhancements in crimes where
the defendant demonstrably harbored racist motivations. The Supreme
Court weighed in on this issue in Wisconsin v. Mitchell.162 The Court held
that penalty enhancements for committing a crime when motivated by
racism are constitutional and do not violate the First Amendment.163 In
that case, the defendant's "sentence for aggravated battery was enhanced
because he intentionally selected his victim on account of the victim's
race."64 Aggravated battery "ordinarily carries a maximum sentence of
two years' imprisonment [in Wisconsin]. But because ... [the defendant]
had intentionally selected his victim because of [his] race, the maximum
sentence for [the defendant's] offense was increased to seven years."65
The Wisconsin Supreme Court advanced the argument against the en-
hancement based on racist thought. It held that the statute "'violates the
First Amendment directly by punishing ... offensive thought.'... '[Tihe
statute punishes ... the reason the defendant selected the victim, the mo-
tive behind the selection.' And . . . 'the Wisconsin legislature cannot
criminalize bigoted thought with which it disagrees.' "166 The Wisconsin
Supreme Court also found the statute unconstitutionally overbroad.167
That court, as described by the United States Supreme Court, held that
"in order to prove that a defendant intentionally selected his victim be-
cause of the victim's protected status, the State would often have to intro-
duce evidence of the defendant's prior speech, such as racial epithets ....
[which the court considered] protected speech."168
The United States Supreme Court disagreed with the Wisconsin High
court. The statute, said the Court, simply "enhances the maximum pen-
alty for conduct motivated by a discriminatory point of view more severely
than the same conduct engaged in for some other reason or for no reason
at all."169 The Court held this constitutional. The "'Constitution does not
erect a per se barrier to the admission of evidence concerning [ ] beliefs
and associations at sentencing simply because those beliefs and associa-
tions are protected by the First Amendment.' Thus, ... the sentencing
160. 838 N.E.2d 187 (Ill. App. Ct. 2005).
161. Id. at 201.
162. 508 U.S. 476 (1993).
163. Id. at 485-90.
164. Id. at 479.
165. Id. at 480 (citations omitted).
166. Id. at 482 (citations omitted).
167. Id.
168. Id. The Wisconsin court also "distinguished antidiscrimination laws, which have
long been held constitutional, on the ground that the Wisconsin statute punishes the
'subjective mental process' of selecting a victim because of his protected status,
whereas antidiscrimination laws prohibit 'objective acts of discrimination."' Id.
169. Id. at 485 (emphasis added).
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judge [may] take into account the defendant's racial animus towards his
victim."170
Indeed, accusations of hate crimes are quite often handled with spe-
cial attention due to their importance and sensitivity. For example, the
town of Dexter, Maine employs the following procedure for racially-moti-
vated hate crimes. First, it "refer[s] the complaint to [a senior officer] for
an initial investigation."171 Then, the investigatory results are "forwarded
to the Maine Attorney General's Office, Civil Rights Division. Any prose-
cution that is deemed appropriate under the State's hate crimes or bias
laws is conducted by the State of Maine, and not by the Town of Dexter or
its police department."172
For sure, however, the Supreme Court has recognized limits to pun-
ishing racist thought. In R.A. V.v. City of St. Paul,173 the defendant con-
structed a
cross [and] then allegedly burned [it] inside the fenced yard of a
black family.... Although this conduct could have been punished
under any of a number of laws, one of the two provisions under
which respondent city of St. Paul chose to charge petitioner (then
a juvenile) was the St. Paul Bias-Motivated Crime Ordinance,
which provides: "Whoever places on public or private property a
symbol, object, appellation, characterization or graffiti, including,
but not limited to, a burning cross or Nazi swastika, which one
knows or has reasonable grounds to know arouses anger, alarm or
resentment in others on the basis of race, color, creed, religion or
gender commits disorderly conduct and shall be guilty of a
misdemeanor."174
Notably, St. Paul's statute was unlike most hate-crime statutes and all
penalty enhancements, in that the punishment for the racist view was not
tied to some other criminal act. The racist view and expression was the
substance of the criminalization itself, and, accordingly, impacted most
directly the First Amendment. The Court declared "that burning a cross
in someone's front yard is reprehensible," but held that "St. Paul has suf-
ficient means at its disposal to prevent such behavior without adding [a
violation of] the First Amendment to the fire."175 Indeed, the Court em-
phasized this point: "One must wholeheartedly agree with the Minnesota
Supreme Court that 'it is the responsibility, even the obligation, of diverse
communities to confront such notions in whatever form they appear,' but
the manner of that confrontation cannot consist of selective limitations
upon speech."176 St. Paul's statute failed constitutional scrutiny because it
did not enact "a general 'fighting words' law," but, rather, "silenc[ed]
170. Id. at 486. The Court also rejected the overbreadth argument as "speculative." Id. at
489.
171. Austin v. Town of Dexter, 522 F. Supp. 2d 38, 49 (D. Me. 2008).
172. Id.
173. 505 U.S. 377 (1992).
174. Id. at 379-80.
175. Id. at 396.
176. Id. at 392 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
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speech on the basis of its content."177 The Court highlighted that "[tihat is
precisely what the First Amendment forbids. The politicians of St. Paul
are entitled to express that hostility-but not through the means of im-
posing unique limitations upon speakers who (however benightedly)
disagree."178
That we punish and sentence crimes more severely because the perpe-
trators are motivated by racist beliefs-and do nothing of the sort for
crimes motivated by liberal or conservative ideology-perhaps best dem-
onstrates that the label "racist" is singular in its opprobrium and wholly
dissimilar to the labels "liberal" and "conservative."
VII. CONCLUSION
Being branded a "racist" carries severe repercussions in, inter alia,
employment, admission to the bar, jury selection and service, and the
punishment of crime. Further, wrongfully accusing someone of racism
can give rise to an actionable claim for defamation as long as the assertion
implies or presents underlying assertions able to be proven false. In con-
trast, political affiliation generally has no place in employment decisions,
bar admission, jury service, and the punishment of crime. And false ac-
cusations of liberal or conservative affiliation are simply not actionable.
My father lived under both fascist and communist rule, and when he
came to the United States, he fought against discrimination, including ra-
cial segregation. He experienced bigotry that many of us could not even
imagine. He would have been the first to say that the appellation of "ra-
cist" is deprecatory precisely because it rightly reflects the evil of mass
hatred. If we discontinue recognizing the pejorative nature of the label,
we risk losing sight of the immorality of the discrimination that it seeks to
indict.
Finally, to the authors of Democrat-Gazette's editorial that equated the
label "racist" with the descriptions "liberal" and "conservative," I offer
the following friendly suggestion. Conduct a test. Put a bumper sticker
on your car and a pin on your cardigan with the words "I AM A LIB-
ERAL." Do this for a week. Note the reactions you receive. In the fol-
lowing week, change the words on the sticker and pin to "I AM A
177. Id. In addition, hate speech codes, typically found at universities, have attempted to
restrict racist speech. David L. Hudson Jr., Hate Speech and Campus Speech Codes,
FIRST AMENDMENT CENTER, http://www.firstamendmentcenter.org/speech/pub
college/topic.aspx?topic=campus-speechcodes (last visited Apr. 28, 2008). Advo-
cates "charge that hate speech subjugates minority voices and prevents them from
exercising their own First Amendment rights." Id. Demonstrating the particular
seriousness with which universities have attempted to treat racist speech, "[m]ore
than 350 public colleges and universities regulated some forms of hate speech...
[by] 1995." Id. However, "[tihe speech codes that have been challenged in court
have not fared well. Courts have struck these policies down as being either over-
broad or vague." Id. In Doe v. University of Michigan, 721 F. Supp. 852, 868 (E.D.
Mich. 1989), the court concluded about the University of Michigan's hate speech
code that "[w]hile the Court is sympathetic to the University's obligation to ensure
equal educational opportunities for all of its students, such efforts must not be at the
expense of free speech."
178. R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 396.
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RACIST." Do this for a week. Note the reactions. I suspect that this ex-
periment will do more to convince you of this article's thesis than any-
thing that I have written.
